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Due Process and the Future of Class Actions 
Alexandra D. Lahav* 
INTRODUCTION 
How should due process doctrine constrain the class action device 
and other forms of aggregate litigation that look and feel like class 
actions?1  Since courts’ conceptions of due process determine the scope 
of collective litigation, this short Essay considers these conceptions of 
due process and asks what ought they be.  Its main contribution is to 
demonstrate how conceptions of due process from other areas of the 
procedural law map on to class actions, and to begin an inquiry into 
what is missing from these conceptions. 
Whatever due process doctrine generally requires, for class actions it 
requires this: No absent class member can be bound by a class action 
judgment without adequate representation.2  In money damages class 
actions, absent class members are entitled to notice and the right to opt 
out.3  Due process ideas matter even in court decisions ostensibly based 
only on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,4 because how courts read 
Rule 23 appears to depend on their conceptions of how much process is 
 
 * Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  Thanks to Mathilde Cohen and Sachin 
Pandya for their helpful comments on previous drafts, the participants in the conference at the 
Loyola University Chicago Law School, and the editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal. 
1. These include “quasi class actions,” a term recently popularized by Judge Weinstein to 
describe aggregate settlement practices.  See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 
488, 491–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  See also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class 
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 105, 116–17 (2010). 
2. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940) (holding that a class action cannot bind a litigant 
absent adequate representation); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(permitting Agent Orange class members who had not opted out and whose injuries manifested 
after the Agent Orange settlement closed to sue), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 
(2003). 
3. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).  In injunctive class actions, the 
Court has not yet held that absent members are entitled to notice and a right to opt out as a due 
process matter, and the federal rules require neither.  See id. at 812 n.3 (declining to rule on the 
question of due process requirements for injunctive or other class actions); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (holding that where monetary relief is not incidental to a 
claim for injunctive relief, an injunctive class cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2)). 
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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due both to absent class members and to defendants. 
There are at least three conceptions of due process embedded in the 
law of class actions.  “Traditional” due process is based on the due 
process parameters traditionally available in Anglo-American law.  
“Cost-benefit” due process, embodied in the three-factor test from 
Mathews v. Eldridge,5 balances the desire for accuracy with the need to 
efficiently dispose of the great mass of litigation.  “Dignitary” due 
process values participation in legal proceedings as a way of 
demonstrating respect for individual dignity.6 
This Essay discusses each of these conceptions and what each implies 
for the law of class actions.  It then suggests a fourth conception that has 
not yet been adopted by class action law: a due process requirement of 
process equality, under which similarly situated individuals deserve 
similar outcomes and the rules of the legal system must tend to equalize 
the ability of system participants to participate.  In so doing, this Essay 
provides a point of departure for exploring the role of equality in class 
actions and civil litigation in general.7 
I. TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS 
The traditional conception of due process is that it encompasses the 
process and rights traditionally available in Anglo-American law.  
Perhaps the most restrictive embodiment of this approach to due process 
doctrine is that articulated by Justice Scalia in Burnham v. Superior 
Court of California.8  That case posed the question of whether a person 
could be subject to personal jurisdiction in a state solely on the basis of 
service of process.  In Burnham, the Court held that a person who is 
present in a state and served with process may be subject to personal 
 
5. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
6. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary 
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in 
Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126, 127–28 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1977); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
273–304 (2004). 
7. Other scholars have noted this principle in civil litigation more generally, although it has 
not received sustained analysis.  See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil 
Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1866–67 & n.8 (2002) (describing how most scholars 
assert equality as a value in civil procedure without explaining it); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent 
and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 39 (1994) (“[N]ational uniformity of federal law ensures that similarly situated litigants 
are treated equally; this is considered a hallmark of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of 
law.”); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 855 (1984) (“Procedural systems are 
supposed to treat like cases alike; consistency is the systematic analogue to the impartiality 
feature demanded of individual decisionmakers.”). 
8. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
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jurisdiction there for actions that are unrelated to his presence or 
conduct in the state.9  Justice Scalia began his opinion by citing the 
English Year Books and subsequently Lord Coke (in decisions dating 
from 1482 and 1612, respectively) for the proposition that in order for a 
court to issue a valid judgment, it must have jurisdiction over the 
defendant.10  He went on to explain that “[t]o determine whether the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, we have 
long relied on the principles traditionally followed by American 
courts . . . .”11  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the decision that 
moved away from the concept of presence as the touchstone of personal 
jurisdiction to the idea of fairness to the defendant, is framed by Justice 
Scalia in Burnham as about tradition: “[W]e have only been called upon 
to decide whether these ‘traditional notions’ permit States to exercise 
jurisdiction over absent defendants in a manner that deviates from the 
rules of jurisdiction applied in the 19th century.”12  The baseline in this 
conception of due process is some point in the distant past which 
comports with due process per se and to which all changes in the 
doctrine are to be compared.  Accordingly, under this view, the process 
due need not comport with modern ideas of fairness.  In Justice Scalia’s 
conception of due process, the process due was frozen in 1868, the year 
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.13 
Although many due process cases focus on tradition, not all of them 
take Scalia’s freezer approach.  Tradition can be defined at various 
levels of generality.14  The more abstractly the tradition is described, the 
 
9. Id. at 619. 
10. Id. at 608. 
11. Id. at 609.  The Justice cited Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), for this proposition.  
The majority in Pennoyer itself did not invoke tradition, but instead relied on fundamental 
principles of sovereignty as well as the newly minted due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 733.  Justice Hunt’s dissent in Pennoyer argued that the case was wrongly 
decided in part because it diverged from tradition.  See id. at 737 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (“In my 
opinion, this decision is at variance with the long-established practice under the statutes of the 
States of this Union, is unsound in principle, and, I fear, may be disastrous in its effects.”). 
12. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609–10.  The reference to “traditional notions” of course refers to 
the test articulated in International Shoe that courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant so long as he has such minimum contacts with the forum that the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  Int’l Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
13. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611. 
14. See Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“Even when prior cases explicitly designate a right 
in those terms, limitations of space as well as the institutional limitations embodied in Article 
III’s case or controversy requirement will mean that those prior cases have not spelled out the 
precise contours of the right.  The question then becomes: at what level of generality should the 
Court describe the right previously protected and the right currently claimed?  The more 
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more malleable the tradition can be to the needs of modern practice.  
The more specifically or narrowly the tradition is defined, the less 
adaptable it will be to modern circumstances.15  Whether this is 
normatively desirable depends on the observer’s point of view in the 
particular context in which the due process question arises.16   
A number of due process cases invoke tradition at a more abstract 
level.  In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, for 
example, Justice Frankfurter wrote that due process expresses “respect 
enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been 
evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and 
civilization . . . .”17  Unlike the view expressed by Justice Scalia in 
Burnham, however, Justice Frankfurter presents a tradition of due 
process less grounded in a particular historical moment and more as an 
evolving conception rooted in our common law tradition.  He wrote: 
“Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, 
and more particularly between the individual and government, ‘due 
process’ is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, 
and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we 
profess.”18 
More recently, in Taylor v. Sturgell,19 the Supreme Court rejected the 
emerging doctrine of “virtual representation,” which threatened to 
preclude absent parties from bringing suit without the protections of the 
class action.  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg 
underscored the importance of the traditional principle that every person 
is entitled to his or her day in court.  She explained, “[i]ndicating the 
 
abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right 
will fall within its protection.”). 
15. These tactics have come up explicitly in the substantive due process context.  In Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a 
California statute that created a presumption that a child born within a marriage was the 
biological child of the husband violated a putative father’s procedural and substantive due process 
rights.  Justice Scalia explained that to determine the relevant tradition the courts must “refer to 
the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the 
asserted right can be identified.”  Id. at 127 n.6. 
16. For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Supreme Court 
controversially applied the Mathews due process factors to the detention of an American citizen.  
The more traditional view in that case, articulated by Justice Scalia in dissent, was more rights 
protective than the process that the due process calculus would require.  See id. at 555, 575–76 
(explaining the constitutional tradition of trial for treason and writing that, with respect to the 
Mathews test, “Whatever the merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights are 
at issue (and even there they are questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the 
common law already supply an answer”). 
17. 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
18. Id. at 162–63. 
19. 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
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strength of that tradition, we have often repeated the general rule that 
‘one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he 
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by 
service of process.’”20  Although Justice Ginsburg did not give tradition 
as one of the reasons for rejecting the doctrine of virtual representation, 
the opinion makes clear that exceptions to the “day in court ideal” are 
modern aberrations from a solid traditional core conception that each 
person is entitled to his or her own day in court.  Justice Ginsburg 
presents the class action as one of these, a “limited circumstance” where 
representation can stand in for actual participation.21 
The due process cases discussed above are not squarely about class 
actions.  In class action cases, the traditional view is more subtly 
framed, but still present.  In Hansberry v. Lee, the Court took pains to 
produce a common law pedigree for the class action as an “invention of 
equity” imported from England.22  And in a number of cases, the 
Supreme Court has limited class actions in order to vindicate the “day in 
court ideal” which forms the traditional baseline against which the class 
action exception is judged.  For example, in Martin v. Wilkes, the Court 
affirmed each individual’s right to their own day in court, holding that 
individuals whose rights are affected by a class action need not 
intervene in order to avoid the preclusive effect of the suit; it is the 
responsibility of the litigants to join them.23  Recently, in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court reiterated the exceptionalism of the class 
action, in contradistinction to the “usual rule” which, although unstated, 
must be defined by tradition.24 
Relying on the tradition of the individual’s right to his day in court, 
the focus of class action jurisprudence has been on providing robust 
individual opt-out rights, permitting collateral attack by absent class 
members, and strengthening defendants’ rights to bring individual 
defenses in order to defeat class certification.25  Tradition is not the only 
argument driving a preference for individual litigation, but it is among 
them. 
 
20. Id. at 893 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). 
21. Id. at 894. 
22. 311 U.S. at 42 (citing English common law cases permitting class actions). 
23. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1074, 1076–77. 
24. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (“The class action is ‘an 
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 
parties only.’” (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979))). 
25. On this last point, see id. at 2561 (underscoring Wal-Mart’s entitlement to individual 
determinations of plaintiffs’ entitlements to back pay). 
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This tradition is contested.  Able scholars have shown that the class 
action and other types of non-party preclusion have antecedents in the 
distant past.26  We even see this invention of the past in the Court’s own 
citation patterns.  Initially, the Court cited a civil procedure treatise for 
the proposition that every person is entitled to his or her own day in 
court.27  More recently, the court has assimilated the proposition and 
cites precedent.28  Nevertheless, the perception of tradition may be 
more important than the true history.29  Traditional due process doctrine 
understands the class action as an aberration which ought to remain 
limited and marginalized. 
II. COST-BENEFIT DUE PROCESS 
In contrast to the traditional view of due process, the cost-benefit 
approach entirely rejects tradition in favor of balancing of interests.  
The due process doctrine articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge30 is 
founded on a cost-benefit analysis—it requires the court to balance the 
risk of error of a particular procedure and the value of additional 
procedural safeguards in light of the interests of the parties and/or the 
government.31  Justifications for the class action device based on the 
accurate disposition of the great mass of cases or enabling class 
litigation to deter corporate misconduct best fit this conceptualization of 
due process. 
This positive view of the class action was more often invoked in the 
 
26. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); Robert Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: 
Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990); Robert 
Bone, The “Day in Court Ideal” and Non-Part Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 206–12 
(1992) (describing eighteenth and nineteenth century common law doctrines of virtual 
representation that bring the “day in court ideal” into question); Samuel Issacharoff & John F. 
Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Accident 
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (2004) (describing aggregate settlement as a powerful 
counter-tradition in American tort law). 
27. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 
Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996); Martin v Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1074, 1076–77 (all 
quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4449 (1st ed. 1981)). 
28. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (citing Richards, 517 U.S. at 797). 
29. See Adriaan Lanni, Precedent and Legal Reasoning in Classical Athenian Courts: A 
Noble Lie?, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 27, 51 (1999) (“The extravagant rhetorical gestures to the rule 
of law and precedent in Athenian lawcourt speeches seem to indicate that the Athenians 
recognized the value of promoting respect for the judicial process but were not prepared to 
sacrifice the broad discretionary powers of the Athenian juries for predictability.”). 
30. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
31. Id. at 335. 
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early years of class action litigation.  For example, in Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, the Court explained, “Class actions also may permit the 
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually.”32  An opt-out class action, the Court held, correctly 
balances the benefits of collective action with the costs of binding 
absent parties without express consent.33  The Court explained: 
The plaintiff’s claim may be so small, or the plaintiff so unfamiliar 
with the law, that he would not file suit individually, nor would he 
affirmatively request inclusion in the class if such a request were 
required by the Constitution.  If, on the other hand, the plaintiff’s 
claim is sufficiently large or important that he wishes to litigate it on 
his own, he will likely have retained an attorney or have thought about 
filing suit, and should be fully capable of exercising his right to “opt 
out.” 
. . . [F]or the reasons stated we do not think that the Constitution 
requires the State to sacrifice the obvious advantages in judicial 
efficiency resulting from the “opt out” approach for the protection of 
the rara avis portrayed by petitioner.34 
In Phillips Petroleum, the Court also considered the limits of due 
process protection for absent class members and noted the limited 
benefits of the additional safeguard of direct participation as compared 
to the likelihood of loss.35  The class action plaintiff will not suffer a 
default judgment should the proceeding not go his or her way.  The 
Court explained: 
Unlike a defendant in a civil suit, a class-action plaintiff is not 
required to fend for himself.  The court and named plaintiffs protect 
his interests. 
. . .                                                                                                         
. . . They need not hire counsel or appear. They are almost never 
subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs.  
Absent plaintiff class members are not subject to coercive or punitive 
remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment typically bind an absent 
plaintiff for any damages, although a valid adverse judgment may 
extinguish any of the plaintiff’s claims which were litigated.36 
The cost-benefit approach is also evident in the courts’ concerns 
about the impact of class actions on defendants, especially the pressure 
to settle non-meritorious cases.  The best known articulation of this 
concern is Judge Posner’s opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rohrer, 
 
32. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,  472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 813–14 (footnote omitted). 
35. Id. at 809. 
36. Id. at 809–10 (footnote omitted). 
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Inc.37  One reason for class de-certification in that case was the threat of 
bankruptcy such a class action allegedly posed to the defendant.38  The 
same balancing of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests can be found in 
more recent Supreme Court decisions.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. described 
the small claims class action as “alchemy” that turns a small right into a 
massive reward.39  While Justice Ginsburg agreed that the class action 
device was an efficient means of allowing plaintiffs to vindicate rights, 
she also saw the collective action as potentially causing an “exorbitant 
inflation of penalties.”40 
The Supreme Court has been losing its taste for prioritizing the 
efficient collective resolution of disputes over individual autonomy.  
Adventuresome attempts to resolve large-scale problems, such as the 
massive influx of asbestos cases, met with strict readings of Rule 23.41  
This pushed mass settlements to more informal, aggregative 
procedures.42  Courts’ interpretation of the adequacy of representation 
requirement also seems to have made it impossible to settle any class 
actions where future class members’ claims are at issue.43  As Sam 
Issacharoff explained, “class actions seemed to drop out of the available 
set of tools for attempting to settle most mass torts, absent some 
extraordinary willingness of a settling defendant to allow some form of 
future claims to return to the tort system.”44 
 
37. 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995).  See also Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to 
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (critiquing the 
blackmail thesis). 
38. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1299. 
39. See 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court today approves 
Shady Grove’s attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award, although the State 
creating the right to recover has proscribed this alchemy.”). 
40. Id. at 1465. 
41. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821–22, 864 (overturning use of Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) to certify a mandatory limited fund class action arising out of injuries caused by 
exposure to asbestos); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597, 619–20 (1997) 
(overturning class settlement of large numbers of asbestos claims in part on grounds of 
inadequate representation). 
42. See supra note 1 (describing quasi class actions); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for 
“Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 592 (2012) (describing the use of a matrix to settle 
aggregated claims). 
43. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting a 
collateral attack on class settlement of Agent Orange litigation on grounds of inadequate 
representation), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). 
44. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 208 
(footnote omitted).  The problems that result from permitting back end opt outs for currently 
uninjured class members can be seen in spades in the Fen-Phen litigation.  See Alexandra D. 
Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 383, 413–16 (2007) (describing Fen-Phen settlement).  The use of class actions for 
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The culmination of the trend against a cost-benefit analysis that takes 
into account the collective benefits of the class action to plaintiffs as 
well as its costs to defendant is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, in which 
the Court rejected the idea of using statistical analysis to determine and 
allocate damages.45  Without the possibility of what that opinion 
derisively referred to as “Trial by Formula,”46 it will be difficult to 
certify many class actions.  This demonstrates the shift away from a 
balancing approach to greater concern about individual rights and 
litigant autonomy.  In Wal-Mart, that concern was triggered by the 
defendant’s assertion of its rights to litigate its individual defenses 
against plaintiffs.47 
By contrast, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,48 another class 
action case from the 2011 term, the Court embraced the concept of 
efficiency paradoxically, by favoring individual arbitration over 
collective arbitration.  Though it described AT&T’s arbitration 
agreement in favorable terms, the federal district court found that the 
agreement was unconscionable because it did not render the same 
deterrent effects as would a class action.49  The Supreme Court 
reversed, claiming that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration 
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment.”50 
The cost-benefit approach to due process does not dictate how the 
costs and benefits of a procedure will be weighed.51  As a result, the 
cost-benefit framework permits the increased emphasis on individual 
 
resolving mass tort cases is not yet dead, as the attempts to resolve the BP oil spill through a class 
action settlement shows; but even if that settlement succeeds, it will be a rare case that can be 
resolved in this way.  See Preliminary Approval Orders, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater 
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012) (MDL No. 2179, Rec. 
Docs. 6418 & 6419).  
45. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
46. See id. at 2561 (“We disapprove [of] that novel project.”). 
47. Id. 
48. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). 
49. Id. at 1745. 
50. Id. at 1751.  The Court’s assumptions about arbitration led Justice Breyer to ask, “Where 
does the majority get its contrary idea—that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a 
‘fundamental attribute[e]’ of arbitration?”  Id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
51. As Jerry Mashaw pointed out when the Mathews calculus was first articulated by the 
Supreme Court, it requires a theory of value that the Court did not supply.  See Jerry L. Mashaw, 
The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) (“The 
Eldridge Court conceives of the values of procedure too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of 
procedural protections as ensuring accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs 
that flow from incorrect decisions.  No attention is paid to ‘process values’ . . . .”). 
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rights, either the defendants’ rights or those of individuals within the 
class, that worked against class treatment in the Wal-Mart decision.  
The same framework can also emphasize the access to justice made 
possible by collective litigation.  Both individual rights and access to 
justice are important values and the due process calculus provides no 
framework for evaluating their relative merits.  Nevertheless, the 
modern class action fits best within a cost-benefit framework that asks 
to what extent the procedure will allow plaintiffs to vindicate rights 
compared to the alternative of individual suits. 
III. DIGNITARY DUE PROCESS 
The dignitary theory of due process focuses on the importance of 
individual participation in litigation.  This theory is most closely 
associated with the work of Jerry Mashaw and Frank Michelman.52  
Dignitary theory dovetails with social-psychological studies of 
procedural justice finding that people perceive outcomes as more 
legitimate when the participants are given the opportunity to be heard.53  
Frank Michelman, for example, considered participation to be important 
psychologically to individuals even when their participation did not 
affect the outcome and when the outcome is “the most unfavorable one 
imaginable.”54 Participation may also have a slightly different 
expressive function of recognizing the (often powerless) individual 
directly.55  Permitting participation so as to promote individual dignity 
may have an important expressive function of recognizing the equal 
worth of individuals, even if the individual’s participation does not 
improve outcomes or provide psychological wellbeing to the 
participant. 
A dignitary theory of due process is difficult to reconcile with the 
class action device.  Dignitary theory depends on individual 
participation and the court’s attention to the individual’s concerns, 
whereas the class action is a collective device that obscures individuals 
 
52. See sources cited supra note 6. 
53. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 
in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark. P. Zanna ed., 1992) 
(arguing that regular procedures convey respect for the individual and thereby increase legitimacy 
of the process).  For a general reflection on the relationship between Tyler’s work and federal 
court procedures, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the 
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011). 
54. Michelman, supra note 6, at 127–28. 
55. Cf. SUSAN SILBEY & PATRICIA EWING, THE COMMONPLACE OF LAW 188 (1998) 
(discussing the possibility of individual acts of resistance in legal proceedings to spur collective 
resistance).  One of the most significant contributions of Silby and Ewing’s book is to 
demonstrate the variety of relations between individuals and formal legal structures. 
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in favor of group treatment.  Dignity, and the values of participation and 
individual autonomy that are its corollaries, have been mostly a tool for 
dismantling class actions.  Phillips Petroleum Co., for example, tried to 
argue against a regional class action on the grounds that due process 
demanded a sufficient contact between each class member and the 
forum.56  Wal-Mart successfully argued that collective litigation would 
effectively bar it from presenting individualized defenses against 
plaintiffs.57  Although dignitary theory may have had its genesis in 
academic considerations of the rights of persons against the state with 
respect of social programs, such as welfare and social security 
payments,58 in the class action realm today, the threads of dignitary 
theory are picked up in defendants’ assertions of their rights to present 
individualized defenses against each of the plaintiffs.  This is because 
while dignity of plaintiffs may imply access to equalizing resources in 
litigation, dignity of defendants implies individualized trials. 
Nevertheless, some rights provided for in current class action practice 
may have a relationship to dignitary theory, even if this relationship is 
not directly expressed in the case law.  For example, in Devlin v. 
Scardeletti, the Court held that class members who objected to a 
settlement may appeal without intervening,59 because “[t]o hold 
otherwise would deprive non-named class members of the power to 
preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind 
them, despite their expressed objections before the trial court.”60  The 
Court thereby recognized the importance of the class members’ 
individual voices, even if it didn’t use the language of dignity.  The 
right to opt out of a class litigation—at least in money damages class 
actions—and to challenge class actions on behalf of claimants whose 
injuries are not yet manifest present similar cases where dignity theory 
could be a rationale for the outcome.61 
IV. PROCESS EQUALITY 
A fourth conception of due process is grounded in the idea that the 
 
56. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
57. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
58. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 6 (discussing dignitary theory in the 
context of Social Security benefits); Michelman, supra note 6 (discussing dignitary theory in the 
context of entitlement programs). 
59. 536 U.S. 1, 16 (2002). 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626–27 
(1997) (discussing conflicts of interest between currently injured class members and those with 
future injuries in a nationwide asbestos class action settlement). 
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legal system ought to equalize individuals’ opportunity to litigate and 
the outcomes that litigation reaches with respect to similarly situated 
individuals.  The idea of a due process right to equality is expressed in 
the axiom that like cases ought to be treated alike.62  Process equality 
could entitle similarly situated individuals to similar outcomes and, as a 
corollary, reject any process that results in unequal treatment of 
similarly situated litigants without explanation, because such a process 
appears arbitrary.63  Less controversially, equality as a process right 
could imply that participants in the legal system must be subjected to 
rules that tend to equalize their ability to litigate.64 
The class action device and some other aggregate litigation 
procedures further both conceptions of litigant equality.  First, the class 
action furthers equality between litigants on opposite sides, especially 
with respect to resources.  For example, in the recent BP litigation, one 
of the plaintiffs’ lawyers said that, “There’s only one place where a 
waitress or a shrimper can be on equal footing with a company the size 
of BP, and that’s a courtroom.”65  The truth, however, is that the 
shrimper or waitress is not standing on his or her own, but is in fact a 
member of a large group represented by the same lawyer or set of 
lawyers.  These economies of scale enable the plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
obtain the resources necessary to litigate against a defendant with 
substantial assets, such as BP.  In contrast, in the ordinary case, very 
few free or low-cost legal resources are available to individuals who 
cannot pay for counsel.66  As a result, class actions enable individuals to 
 
62. See, e.g., Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“Discretion is not 
whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of 
justice that like cases should be decided alike.”). 
63. I make the case for equality of outcomes in Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 
supra note 42.  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor 
Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 576 (1983) (“Equality is morally necessary because it compels us 
to care about how people are treated in relation to one another.  Equality is analytically necessary 
because it creates a presumption that people should be treated alike and puts the burden of proof 
on those who wish to discriminate.  Finally, the principle of equality is rhetorically necessary 
because it is a powerful symbol that helps to persuade people to safeguard rights that otherwise 
would go unprotected.”). 
64. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1313 (2012) (arguing that right holders who cannot vindicate their rights for lack of 
resources are effectively deprived of that right and therefore that litigation resources ought to be 
taken into account in determining the effectiveness of rights); Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 1867–
68 (discussing equipage equality); Alan Werthheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303, 304–05 (1988). 
65. Debbie Elliot, BP’s Oil Slick Set to Spill into Courtroom, NPR (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/16/146938630/bps-oil-slick-set-to-spill-into-courtroom. 
66. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) (“According to most estimates, about 
four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-
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be part of a lawsuit who might not otherwise be able to enforce their 
rights. 
Second, the class action furthers equality by better ensuring equal 
outcomes among similarly situated litigants on the same side.  In 
individual tort litigation, for example, outcomes are sometimes 
inconsistent for similarly situated parties67 because cases are decided at 
different points in time by different judges or juries.  But in collective 
litigation, all the cases are before the court at once.  For this reason 
fruitful comparisons and matrixes can be set up in collective litigation to 
provide equal treatment to similarly situated people.  For example, in 
the joint memorandum submitted to the court in the BP oil spill 
litigation, the parties wrote of the settlement: “The principle was two-
fold: to design claims frameworks that fit a wide array of damage 
categories, and, within each category, to treat like claims alike, so as to 
proceed with both fairness and predictability.”68 
The difficulty lies in creating a conception of equality that is 
analytically distinct from existing conceptions of due process, coherent 
on its own terms, and able to be translated into existing constitutional 
law. For example, it is difficult for judges in mass litigation to 
determine who is sufficiently alike to require equal treatment and which 
differences between litigants ought to be recognized.  Nor is a principle 
of equality of outcomes sufficient to justify collective procedures—after 
all, a legal system may be consistent across cases, but the outcomes 
themselves unjustifiable on other grounds.  And if society as a whole 
does not provide equal resources for individuals but only equality of 
opportunity, why should the courts be any different?69  After all, at the 
 
income individuals, remain unmet.”); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, 
Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and 
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2122–23 (2012) (describing unmet need for legal 
services); Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 718 (2010) (“For 
millions of people, access to the civil justice system is virtually blocked.”). 
67. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 42, at 583–91 (describing 
inconsistency of monetary awards in tort cases). 
68. The Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s and BP Defendants’ Memorandum In Support Of 
Joint Motion For (1) Preliminary Approval Of Class Action Settlement, (2) Scheduling A 
Fairness Hearing, (3) Approving And Issuing Proposed Class Action Settlement Notice, And (4) 
BP’s Motion For Adjourning The Limitation Of Liability Trial Counsel For All Moving Parties 
Are Listed At End Of Motion,  In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mexico, on April 20, 2010 (E.D. La. April 8, 2012) (No. 12-970). 
69. The question posed here is similar to the one about constitutional law.  Is it enough for the 
courts to assure that the process for reaching an outcome in a particular case is fair, or must the 
courts assure that the substance of the law is adhered to—that is, must the courts assure only a 
right process or also a correct outcome?  Cf. Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1980) (“The process theme by 
itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content 
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moment the court system tolerates inconsistent treatment of litigants as 
a result of unexplained variances in jury verdicts, as well as severe 
inequality between participants entering the justice system.70 
Process equality does not have much of a foundation in the case law.  
Instead, to the extent that judges attempt to adjust procedures to 
encourage equal treatment of litigants, process equality is a 
discretionary, informal process.  The beginnings of a doctrine of process 
equality can be found in some of the due process cases, but it remains 
undeveloped.  The Supreme Court has considered process equality for 
defendants in punitive damages cases,71 in criminal cases,72 and in 
considering the jurisdictional reach of the courts.73  Too much 
unpredictability, the Court has reminded us, can become a due process 
violation when it makes the administration of the laws seem arbitrary 
across different cases.74  Predictability, however, poorly supports a 
robust principle of equality among litigants on the same side and does 
not provide much of a justification for equalization of resources 
between litigants on opposite sides of a lawsuit.  Neither is necessary 
 
supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values—the very sort of theory the 
process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid.”).  Doctrines such as remittitur, which permits 
judges to offer the plaintiff a choice between a lower award or a new trial, as well as the 
availability of appellate review itself, point to an investment in getting the right answer, not just 
getting to any answer in the right way.  11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 160–62 (2d ed. 1995); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 59 (announcing the standard for granting a new trial or altering a judgment). 
70. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula,” supra note 42, at 583–91 (documenting existing 
inequalities). 
71. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499–501 (2008) (stating that “[c]ourts of 
law are concerned with fairness as consistency” and describing inconsistency and unpredictability 
of punitive damages awards as a due process violation); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 583 (1996) (finding that due process requires like punitive damages and civil or criminal 
penalties for comparable misconduct). 
72. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (noting that reducing “unjustified 
disparities” in criminal sentencing is necessary to achieve “the evenhandedness and neutrality that 
are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice”). 
73. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (illustrating 
elements of personal jurisdiction related to the defendant’s procedural due process). 
74. In Exxon v. Baker, the Court justified the requirement that punitive damages be consistent 
across cases on the basis that defendants need to understand what conduct will give rise to 
liability.  The Court explained: “[W]hen the bad man’s counterparts turn up from time to time, the 
penalty scheme they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree 
when they wreak like damage.” Baker, 554 U.S. at 503. See also Gore, 517 U.S. at 586 
(defendant has an “entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on the 
conduct of its business”).  Similarly, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Court 
explained that, “The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws,’ 
gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure 
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not 
render them liable to suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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for predicting legal system outcomes.  Accordingly, more analytical 
work remains to be done to develop a robust principle of process 
equality.75 
CONCLUSION 
Good answers to these questions can at least start with this durable 
intuition: In the United States, we expect that individuals will be treated 
with equal respect and concern in the court system regardless of their 
position.76  The courts are different than other areas of social life, at 
least in part because they have traditionally been understood to be an 
antidote to the power of the state against the individual.77  Equal respect 
and concern implies that courts should provide individuals with an 
equal opportunity to make their case and treat individuals the same 
where there is no articulable, legally relevant reason to differentiate 
between them.  The class action device, as well as some aggregate 
litigation procedures that have recently been developed, goes some way 
toward solving the inequities in the current system. 
A due process jurisprudence sounding in equality is a good way to 
understand the benefits of the class action device and the role of 
individuals within the class.  The focus on individualism in recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence comes at the expense of equality because 
the nature of mass harms and a mass consumption economy pit the 
individual against large institutions.  This individualistic focus is 
consistent with the traditional conception of due process—a horse and 
buggy understanding of litigation that is rooted firmly in the eighteenth 
century.  To the extent that the courts continue to view the class action 
 
75. I develop these justifications further in The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 42, 
at 594–600. 
76. For one discussion of this idea, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227–
28 (1977).  Different people have different views on what equality means, causing some theorists 
to argue that equality is an empty principle or at a minimum too confusing to be useful.  See, e.g., 
PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF 
“EQUALITY” IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) (focusing on the confusion created by 
resorting to principles of equality).  Nevertheless, the invocation of equality remains powerful.  
Consider in this regard the judicial oath of office:  
I, XXX XXX, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without 
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will 
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as 
XXX under the Constitution and laws of the United States.  So help me God.  
28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006).  Or the phrase engraved on the Supreme Court building in Washington, 
D.C.: “Equal Justice Under Law.”  See JUDITH RESNIK AND DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING 
JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC 
COURTROOMS 331 & n.355 (2011). 
77. In the American tradition, this idea can be traced at least to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), which established the power of judicial review. 
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through the lens of the traditional conception of due process, the class 
action will continue to be eroded whether or not the rule-makers reform 
the class action rule.  Competing conceptions of due process, 
particularly those grounded in cost-benefit analysis and equality, are 
more likely to support collective treatment.  Ultimately, the conception 
of due process that the courts adopt will dictate the future of class 
actions. 
 
